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RECENT CASES
AdmiraltySTATES PERMITTED TO REGULATE
MARINE INSURANCE
Plaintiffs' houseboat, used to carry passengers on an artificial lake
between Texas and Oklahoma, was destroyed by fire. Suit was brought
in a Texas state court on a marine insurance policy issued by defendant.
After removing the cause to the district court on the basis of diversity,
the insurer denied liability because plaintiffs allegedly breached certain
warranties. If Texas law were controlling, such breaches might not
preclude recovery.' The district court found for the insurer, holding that
the contract was governed by general admiralty .law. This decision was
affirmed by the circuit court 2 but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial under the law of the appropriate state. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, declared that in the absence of federal legislation
marine insurance should be governed by state law. A limited concurrence
was filed by Justice Frankfurter, who acquiesced in the disposition of this
case, but anticipated that some aspects of marine insurance will demand a
uniform federal rule. Justice Reed, dissenting, argued that the uniformity
doctrine in maritime law required that the federal admiralty jurisdiction
regulate all cases of marine insurance.

Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's

Fund Ins. Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 368 (1955).
Although the Constitution provides merely that "the judicial power

8
shall extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,"

the Supreme Court has interpreted this as establishing a requirement of
uniformity in maritime law.4 This requirement operates not only to in5
validate the application of certain state statutes to maritime situations,
but also to limit admiralty courts in using state law to supplement or
1. Tax. Ray. Civ. STAT. AN. arts. 4890, 4930 (1948).
2. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 201 F.2d 833 (1953).
3. U.S. CoNsr. Art. III, § 2. Marine insurance is a maritime contract and falls
within the federal admiralty jurisdiction. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1
(U.S. 1870); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, No. 3,776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).

4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.

Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); see The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (U.S. 1874).
5. Robins Dry Dock Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925); Washington v. Dawson
& Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149
(1920); Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Even before the articulation of the uniformity doctrine,
early state courts recognized that maritime law was part of the jus gentium and
applied the same law as the federal courts, but in time different substantive maritime
laws developed. Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States,
73 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 223, 242-43 (1925).
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modify maritime law and to circumscribe state courts when they are deciding admiralty suits. 6 Where a right has been granted under general
admiralty law, the maritime rule, rather than a state rule, is applicable
regardless of the forum.7 Despite the absence of congressional action, it
was held in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen8 that a tort occurring within
the admiralty jurisdiction could not be governed by a state workman's
compensation act because it would interfere with the uniformity of the
general maritime law. Even when federal statutes were passed attempting
to permit the application of state compensation remedies to maritime
injuries, these were held an unconstitutional delegation of power. 9 The
uniformity doctrine also has precluded the states from abolishing maritime
rules governing the measure of recovery, 10 and prohibits a state Statute of
Frauds from nullifying a maritime contract. 1
It has always been recognized that there are permissible variances
from federal control over admiralty matters. The "saving clause" of the
Judiciary Act of 178912 permitted the states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction where there was a common-law remedy.' 8 Since there was a common-law lien for towage services, there is no objection to enforcing this by
an in personam suit in a state court.1 4 Under the same theory, states have
been able to regulate forfeiture of fishing nets 15 and partition of a vessel; 167
and charter parties have been subjected to a state arbitration statute.1
The "saving clause" was also utilized by the Court to extend local survival
and wrongful death acts to maritime causes of action.18 Other cases
6. Dickinson & Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 36 CAr.n. L. REV. 169, 216 (1948).

7. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (burden of proof);
Cox v. Roth, 75 Sup. Ct. 242 (1955) (statute of limitations) ; see 103 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 119 (1954).

8. 244 U.S. 205 (1917.)
9. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co.
After this, the Federal Longshoremen's and
v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was passed, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.
§§901-50 (1952), which provides compensation only if state law does not apply, 44
STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (1952).
10. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
11. Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919). But cf. Jarka Corp. v.
Hellenic Lines, 182 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1950) where state law concerning offers was
applied to a maritime contract.
12. 1 STAT. 47 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952).
13. The courts have differed as to what is "saved" to the states. Some declare
that it is only the forum and the remedy, Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247
U.S. 372, 384 (1918), while others have implied that states may be the source of the
See Comment, 26 TEXAS L. REv.
right. Calderola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947).
312 (1948).
14. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900) ; see The Lottawanna,
21 Wall. 558, 580 (U.S. 1874).
15. S. C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
16. Madruga v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
17. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
18. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907).
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rationalized this result on the local nature of the transaction.' 9 When the
circumstances surrounding an injury were classified as "maritime but
local," state law was enforced. 20 The Jensen doctrine was not applied to
the field of unemployment insurance on the ground that this did not affect
"exclusive federal jurisdiction" or uniformity,21 although the Court also
mentioned that Congress had not acted. 2 The majority opinion in Wilburn
appears to rely on congressional failure to legislate on marine insurance
without due consideration of the uniformity requirement.
Although the basis for the maintenance of separate federal admiralty
jurisdiction and uniform maritime decisions is deeply rooted in history,2
if this were its only explanation today some relaxation of the theory might
well be permissible. However, many of the reasons given for its original
establishment are currently applicable. Not only does the maritime law
inspire respect because of its coherence and comprehensiveness, but its
experienced practitioners develop proficiency and skill.2 4 Ocean waters
are the joint property of nations; the Federal Government must regulate
the rights thereunder25 since it will be required to deal with foreign
powers. 26 Another rationale, as relevant today as two centuries ago, is
the desire to free maritime commerce from varying and often intolerable
restrictions incident to local control 2 7 Thus, the requirement of uniformity
is conducive to orderly and harmonious maritime commerce. Nevertheless,
there have been few deleterious results from resort to local regulation since
usually this has been permitted only when the state law did not materially
prejudice the desired uniformity.2 8 The leading opinions indicate these
are limited exceptions, rather than any departure from the theory of
19. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 391 (1941); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921); The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y.

1893).

20. A line of cases awarded compensation under state acts on this theory.
Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) ; Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). But cf. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc.,
314 U.S. 244 (1941); Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries, 317 U.S. 249,
260 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
21. Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 310 (1943).
22. Ibid.
23. See Justice Story's opinion in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, No. 3,776
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815) which traces the history of admiralty jurisdiction. See also
Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CoRNIzr

L.Q. 460 (1925).

24. See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. or PA. L. REv. 792, 804 (1952).
25. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 475 (U.S. 1793).
26. See THME FEDERAsT No. 80, at 553, 555; (Dawson ed. 1863); RoBINSON,
AmrmArA y 10 (1939) ; Wright, Uniformity in the.Maritime Law of the United States,
73 U. oF PA. L. REv. 123, 132-33 (1925) pointing out that if this were the only
reason, admiralty law would be applicable only when a foreigner was involved.
27. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924).
28. But cf. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 581 (U.S. 1874) ; Calderola v. Eckert,
332 U.S. 155 (1947), criticized in Dickinson & Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in the
Supreme Court of the United States, 36 CALIF. L. Rr-v. 169, 193-95, 219 (1948).
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uniformity.2 9

The majority opinion in the instant case, emphasizing lack
of congressional action, effectuates a retreat. While, of course, it is true
that congressional action will supersede state law,3 0 it does not follow that
failure to act leaves the states free to legislate in every area. Once the basic
premise of uniformity is accepted, recognition of an exception permitting
state action should depend not on judicial abdication because of congressional silence, but on consideration of the essential nature of the transaction involved. Applying this test, the marine insurance involved here concerned an essentially local operation and the Court's reluctance to establish a general warranty rule based on this limited case may have been
justified. The re-invigoration of a "maritime but local" exception would
acknowledge the utility of the uniformity doctrine while permitting the
state to act when it alone could best meet the necessities of the situation.

AppealsSECOND CIRCUIT PERMITS APPEAL FROM DENIAL
OF A PERMANENT INJUNCTION SOUGHT BY
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff brought an action seeking both a temporary and a permanent
injunction to stop defendant from copying plaintiff's trade name and corporate title. The request for a temporary injunction was not pressed,
and the district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for a
permanent injunction on the ground that plaintiff had not established its
reputation with the general public in the immediate area at the time when
defendant first used plaintiff's name.' The Second Circuit dismissed a
motion by the defendant to strike plaintiff's appeal, holding that the denial
of summary judgment was a "refusal" to grant an injunction within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(1), and thus was appealable. Federal Glass
Co. v. Loshin, 217 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1954).
Any district court order which terminates litigation on its merits, so
that in case of appeal and affirmance the original judgment will be rendered,
is a final order 2 which upon proper motion may be reviewed by the court
29. Applications of state compensation acts have not been harmful, Dickinson &
Andrews, supra note 28, at 216-17; Wright, supra note 26, at 241-43, and the tort
cases in the "maritime but local" line were confined to peculiarly local circumstances.
30. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
1. Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 126 F. Supp. 737 (D. Conn. 1954).
2. Lewis v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 183 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1950).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952). For ramifications and criticism of this rule sed
Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis of Appeal, 41 YAIE L.J. 539 (1932); Note,
The Final Judgment Rule in the Federal Courts, 47 COL. L. Rzv. 239 (1947).
Under this rule, the court of appeals has refused to review: a denial of a motion
for change of venue,, Bowles v. Culhane, 151 F2d 504 (7th Cir. 1945) ; a denial of a
motion for a directed verdict, Dostal v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 170 F.2d 116 (3d Cir.
1948) ; a denial of a motion to strike various allegations, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
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of appeals. 3 Under this rule, the grant or denial of a permanent injunction
is a reviewable order. 4 On the other hand, the denial of a motion for
summary judgment is not reviewable as a final order r since normally it is
not dispositive of the merits of the claim and the moving party is not foreclosed from adducing sufficient evidence at trial to gain the verdict. Section
1292 lists several exceptions to the "final order" requirement, and permits
an appeal from an interlocutory order "granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolviig injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
" The purpose of this section is to permit appeals from
injunctions...
interlocutory orders whose effects are final and irreparable, in order to
protect the moving party during litigation on the merits.0 Consequently,
the denial 7 or grant 8 of an injunction pendente lite consistently has been
reviewed. The appellate courts rarely have been faced with the problem of
whether a denial of a motion for summary judgment seeking injunctive
relief is a "refusal" to grant an injunction within the meaning of Section
1292.9 In Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp.1° the Third Circuit
considered this problem and declined to review, reasoning that a denial of
summary judgment on the basis of the presence of a triable issue of fact
does not reach the merits of plaintiff's claim, and thus is distinguishable
from a denial of a motion for a temporary injunction. The court found
that this decision worked no hardship on the moving" party, as he still
could seek interlocutory relief through a temporary injunction. 1
v. Banion, 86 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1936) ; a denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint,
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945); a dismissal of the complaint with
leave to amend, Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 47 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1931) ; a
denial of a petition for rehearing, Nealon v. Hill, 149 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1944),

cert. denied, 326 U.S. 753 (1945) ; and a denial of a motion for summary judgment,
see note 5 infra.
On the other hand, the courts have reviewed as final orders: an order granting
dismissal of the action, Asher v. Ruppa, 173 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1949) ; and an order
granting summary judgment, see note 5 infra.
4. E.g., Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, 213 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1954); Drittel v.
Friedman, 154 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1946).
5. E.g., Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1939);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Dutton v.
Cities Service Defense Corp., 197 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1952).
Of course, when summary judgment is granted it is appealable immediately. See,
e.g., Zarati S.S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1946); Lamb v.
Shasta Oil Co., 149 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1945).
6. Cohen v. Beneficial- Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). See also
Maxvell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co., 131 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1942).
7. E.g., Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
8. E.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
9. The Second Circuit held in Raylite Electric Corp. v. Noma Electric Corp., 170
F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1948), that the denial was appealable, but the problem was not discussed. Compare cases cited in note 11 infra.
10. 181 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1950).
11. Id. at 162. Accord, Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 213 F.2d 122 (3d Cir.
1954) ; Albert v. School Dist. of Pittsburg, 181 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1950) ; cf. American
Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1953) (same reasoning applied to a
motion to dismiss) ; Gillespie v. Schram, 108 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1939) (same) ; Reed
v. Lehman, 91 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1937) (same).
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The instant court refused to accede to the reasoning in Morgenstern.
Judge Hand stated that a denial of summary judgment always is dispositive
of some of the merits of the requested injunctive relief. However, this
position would not seem sound in light of the caveat found in the cases
that upon motion for summary judgment the trial judge is simply to as2
certain whether genuine issues of fact are present and not to resolve them.'
He further stated that the same considerations which moved Congress to
allow appeals from the denial of temporary injunctions also applied to the
denial of injunctive relief sought via summary judgment. Judge Frank,
concurring, agrees with Judge Hand that the same considerations are
involved, stating that it is "sheer ritualism" to permit an appeal from the
denial of a motion labelled "temporary injunction" while refusing to review
the denial of a motion seeking injunctive relief labelled "summary judgment." But this position overlooks the fact that a trial judge weighs
3
different factors in considering whether or not to grant these two motions.'
On a motion for summary judgment the moving party must show that:
(1) there is no genuine issue of fact, and (2) he is entitled to the relief
sought as a matter of law. 14 On the other hand, to obtain a temporary
injunction the moving party must show that: (1) there is a reasonable
likelihood that the court will give him the final judgment, (2) he will
suffer irreparable harm if the interlocutory relief is not granted, and (3)
he would suffer greater harm if the injunction were not granted than
defendant would incur if it were. 15 While the facts of the instant case
show that a temporary injunction would not have been granted plaintiff
since he did not establish irreparable harm, the distinction between the
various considerations should have been articulated.
In light of the above distinctions, in any case in which summary judgment is denied because there is a genuine issue of fact, as in Morgenstern,
there is no necessity to permit immediate review. It would seem that a
temporary injunction may be granted even where there is a triable issue of
fact; therefore, the moving party may still obtain his desired interlocutory
relief. Moreover, immediate review of a denial of summary judgment on
the basis of a triable issue of fact would not be of great benefit to the
moving party, for the appellate court's scope of review would be limited to
ascertaining the correctness of the trial court's holding, and it would
6
On the other hand,
seem that rarely would this judgment be overruled.'
12. E.g., Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1950). And see instant
case at 939 (dissenting opinion).
13. In practice Judge Frank certainly has been cognizant of the difference in treatment. Compare Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), with Hamilton
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F.2d
213 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Porter v. Jones, 176 F2d 87 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
885 (1949).
15. E.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.
1953). See 3 MooRE, FFDER.A PRacncE 3326 (1938).
16. Instant case at 940 (dissenting opinion).
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where summary judgment is denied on the basis of the substantive law of
injunctions, it would appear mere formalism to require the moving party to
seek a temporary injunction before permitting him to appeal, 17 for, assuming that the other requirements of a temporary injunction are met, this
relief would still be denied on the same ground that summary judgment
was. Of course, in this situation the trial judge probably would grant a
summary judgment for the other party, and thus the moving party could
appeal.' 8 In the instant case it may be inferred from the fact that the trial
court did not grant summary judgment for the defendant that all the court
decided was either that more evidence must be presented to support the
affidavits on the issue of plaintiff's reputation or that defendant should have
the right to subject plaintiff's witnesses to cross-examination to test their
credibility before a jury. 9 Moreover, the instant case aside, it does not
follow necessarily that every time a judge denies summary judgment on
the basis of the substantive law that he will also deny a temporary injunction. Given a case where the law is doubtful, both the fact that a
temporary injunction is interlocutory and that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require the moving party to post a bond in order to recompense
the restrained party for any losses he has suffered if he should receive the
ultimate judgment, 20 would invite a more liberal approach to granting this
motion. Because of the failure of the instant court to distinguish between
the various factors which are considered by the trial judge upon these
several motions, and its creation of a new avenue of obtaining appellate
review which is both unnecessary and inefficient, the decision is subject to
criticism.

CorporationsPROVISIONS FOR CALL OF COMMON STOCK AT
OPTION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS SUSTAINED
In 1925 the shareholders of defendant corporation, including the plaintiff, voted to amend the articles of incorporation to provide that by the
unanimous vote of the directors all or any shares of common stock could
be called at book value for purchase or for retirement or cancellation in
connection with any reduction of capital. The common stock was owned
primarily by directors, executives, or their families, and, subsequent to the
17. See 6 MooRE,

FEDERAL PRcricE 2321 & n.18 (2d ed. 1953).
18. A proposed amendment to 56(c) would permit the judge to render summary
judgment for the non-moving party when appropriate. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedurefor United States District Courts
49 (May 1954). This, however, is not an innovation but merely codifies the practice
of the great majority of federal courts. See 6 MooRs, FEERL PRActicE 2088-89 &
n.5 (2d ed. 1953).
19. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (c). See Penmac Corp. v. Falcon Pencil Corp., 28 F. Supp.
639 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). ,
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amendment, all directors and executives retiring from the corporation sold
their common stock to the corporation or to the remaining directors or
executives. When the plaintiff withdrew from the corporation, however,
he refused to accede to the previous practice, and for the first time the
directors exercised the provision to call in for purchase plaintiff's common
stock. In a suit by plaintiff to enjoin, the court held that the provision
was valid, since the nature of common stock is not incompatible with a call
provision exercised in good faith and since there was no unreasonable
restraint on alienation. Lewis v.H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 121 N.E.2d
850 (Mass. 1954).
Although the callability of preferred stock at the option of the corporation generally has been sanctioned,' few cases have arisen concerning
the validity of a similar provision involving common stock. However, in
Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co.2 a corporation's attempt to utilize
a call provision to restrict the ownership of common stock to those engaged
in a business germane to that of the corporation, by redeeming all common
stock and re-issuing stock only to those within the limited classification,
was held invalid because common stock was not within the classes of stock
which were subject to call and redemption according to the court's interpretation of the state statute. Although the decision technically was based
on the failure to come within the statutory terms, the court evidenced a
repugnance to the use of the call provision to abrogate the rights of the
minority shareholders at the option of the directors3 On the other hand,
attempts to insure the continuance of control of common stock in the hands
of a particular group 4 usually are sustained against charges of restraint
on alienation, so long as the court considers that the particular method
adopted by the corporation is reasonable. For example, provisions requiring a first offer to the corporation 5 or remaining shareholders before
transfer, or sale to the corporation upon termination of employment, have
been held valid. 6 However, in Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 7 a
1. Crimmins & Peirce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 282 Mass. 367,
375-76, 185 N.E. 383, 386-87 (1933). See Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a
Corporation.of Its Om Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 697, 720
(1941); Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities, 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 83 (1931);
Note, 88 A.L.R. 1131 (1934).
2. 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 Ati. 887 (Ch. 1937).
3. Id. at 384-85, 191 Atl. at 889-90.
4. The provisions have been designed to perpetuate ownership by a particular
group in management, Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914),
by employees, Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723
(Sup. Ct. 1930), or customers, Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902),
with a direct interest in the corporation, or to excluding hostile shareholders, People
ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924).
5. Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902).
6. Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929); Harker
v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1930); Arentsen v. Sherman Towel
Service Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933). For a collection of cases upholding various types of provisions, see Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948); Note, 65 A.L.R.
1159 (1930). For a general discussion of the reasonableness of restrictive provisions.
see O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 (1952) ; Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L. Ray. 229 (1951).
7. 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1938).
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provision requiring all non-employee shareholders to sell their stock at
the option of the corporation was held invalid as a restraint on alienation
where it was not shown that the restraint was necessary for the success
of the corporation, or that the provision would achieve its purpose of identifying ownership with management. The question raised in the present
case was whether a court would sustain a much broader provision than
those involved in Starring and Greene where the corporation's stock had
been held by its directors or executives since incorporation and the provision was used only for the purpose of continuing that pattern of ownership.
The court's primary basis for sustaining the call provision was assimilation of common stock with preferred. Since the state statute had
been interpreted as authorizing redeemable preferred stock, 8 the conclusion
was almost automatic once the court refused to recognize any inherent distinguishing factors between the two classes. Although the reasons for
sustaining the call of preferred stock might not seem appropriate when
applied to common, 9 a distinction based merely on the traditional concepts
of common and preferred would not seem sufficient because of the possibility of a corporation issuing stock endowed with certain attributes of
each. Since the right to share indirectly in the management of the corporation is usually lodged in the common shareholders, 10 the callability of
common stock might find justification as a means of protecting the corporation from shareholders whose interests are adverse to those of the corporation, and of perpetuating the ownership of stock and, consequently,
control of the corporation by a limited group where a need exists for such
control. The provision might also be used to effect a reduction of capital,
similar in theory to a redemption of preferred, while avoiding statutory
formalities. One disadvantage is that the provision would subject dissenting and minority holders to the danger of losing their stock at the
option of the corporate directors. In addition, since the stock is to be
purchased at book value, which may not reflect its actual worth," all
8. See note 1 supra. The statute authorized the issuance of "two or more
classes of stock with such preferences, voting powers, restrictions and qualifications
thereof' as shall be fixed in the articles of incorporation. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 156,

§14 (1948).

9. Preferred stock traditionally has been regarded as a means by which a corporation might attain needed capital without contracting a debt, while reserving to
the common shareholders most of the prerogatives of management. Thus, in addition to the usual preference in dividends and liquidation, corporations attempted to
attract investors by guaranteeing a return of the original investment by redemption
on a stated date or at the option of the holder. 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF
Conversely, redemption at the
CORPORATIONS 128, 152, 160, 165 (5th ed. 1953).
option of the corporation is widely utilized to safeguard the rights of creditors and
other shareholders and to permit the corporation to take advantage of favorable
conditions in the investment market. See Dodd, supra note 1, at 724, 730; Note, 83
U. OF PA. L. REv. 888 (1935). In contrast to the nature of preferred stock, the
holder of common stock has been regarded traditionally as relinquishing the security
of preferred stock, assuming the risk of the success or failure of the enterprise and,
concomitant with this risk, gaining the right to share indirectly in the conduct of the
business. See 11 FarCHER; PRIVATE CoRpoRATioNs § 5086 (perm. ed. 1932).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. See O'Neal, supra note 6, at 798-800.
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holders may be endangered if the corporate directors intend to speculate
with the corporation's stock. To prevent such abuses, the instant court
indicated that it would rely on its ability to find whether the directors, in
using a particular provision, acted in good faith. But this protection
not only would require a determination of when the provision has or has
not been so exercised, but also would place a heavy burden on complain2
One
ing shareholders to prove the improper motives of the directors.'
not
had
call
the
that
prove
to
remedy would be requiring the corporation
deter
might
burden
a
such
Although
been made for an improper purpose.
the use of the provision, it would seem justified since control of common
stock within a certain group, probably one of the major objectives of a call
provision, can be retained by other devices less susceptible to abuse-such
as a first option, or termination of employment provision. The latter provision also may be subject to the complaint concerning proof of good faith,
for an employee may be dismissed without cause in order that the directors
may gain control of the corporation; however, the fact that this provision
legitimately can be used for a narrow and defined purpose would seem to
justify the limited danger of abuse. As far as transferability to a third person is concerned, the ostensible objection to the call provision is that the
uncertainty of whether or not the purchasing shareholder will be able to
retain the stock makes purchase undesirable. This doubt does not seem
greater, however, than that facing the potential purchaser of an employee's
stock which is subject to a requirement of resale to the corporation on the
termination of employment. Moreover, in Rollins the primary objection
concerning alienation was not the method used but the fact that the plan
adopted would not achieve its purported end, that is, identification of management with ownership, and that this identification was not shown to be
necessary for the continued success of the business. As far as the present
case is concerned, the court undoubtedly was influenced by the actions and
nature of the corporation, since the only use that was made of the provision
in approximately twenty-five years was to prevent common stock from
being retained by one who was outside the limited group of employee-shareholders, an apparently legitimate objective since the plan of identifying
shareholders with management had been followed from the time of
incorporation.

CorporationsSTATUTE PERMITTING CLASSIFICATION OF
DIRECTORS VIOLATES CUMULATIVE VOTING
PROVISION OF ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
Montgomery Ward & Company, an Illinois corporation, is governed
by a board of nine directors, each elected for a period of three years. The
board is divided into three equal classes and only one class is elected
12. Id. at 785.
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annually. Section 35 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act permits this
system of classifying directors when the board consists of nine or more
members.1 Plaintiff, a stockholder who is engaged in an attempt to
nominate and elect members of the board, contends that classification of
directors violates the cumulative voting provision of the Illinois Constitution.2 On plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment the court held that
the constitutional section relating to cumulative voting requires that all
directors be elected annually in order to insure each shareholder the maximum voting strength proportionate to his holdings, and therefore that a
statute authorizing classification is unconstitutional. Wolfson v. Avery, No.
54 C 15200, Cook County, Ill., February 1, 1955, aff'd, Ill. Sup. Ct., April
15, 1955.
Either by constitution or statute, cumulative voting is required or
permitted in thirty-nine states, 4 but in the absence of an express provision a stockholder has no right to vote cumulatively 6 Where this right
is conferred by constitution, any provision in a statute, corporate by-law
or charter has been invalidated if it attempts to take away that right or to
defeat the objectives of cumulative voting.6 The vast majority of states
permit classification of directors, 7 and of the thirteen states that have constitutional provisions relating to cumulative voting, eight authorize classification by statute.8 The instant case appears to be the first reported decision in which a statute that permits classification has been challenged. 9
1. ILL.

ANN. STAT.

c.3 2, § 157.35 (1954).

2. "The general assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for directors
or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right to
vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for
as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to cumulate
said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors
multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them
on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such
directors or managers shall not be elected in any other manner." ILL. CoNsT. Art.

XI, §3.
3. N.Y. Times, April 16, 1955, p. 23, col. 1.
4. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Texas, Utah,
and Wisconsin are the only states without such provisions.
5. State v. Perham, 30 Wash.2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948) ; It re American Fibre
Chair Seat Corp., 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 254 (1934) ; State v. Stockley, 45 Ohio St.
304, 13 N.E. 279 (1887) ; 5 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CoaRoRArioNs § 2048 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1952).
6. People v. Cohn, 339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930); People v. Emmerson, 302
Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922); Durkee v. People, 155 Ill. 354, 40 N.E. 626 (1895);
People v. Younger, 238 Ill. App. 502 (1925); Laughlin v. Geer, 121 Ill. App. 534
(1905); Commonwealth v. Green, 351 Pa. 170, 40 A.2d 492 (1945).
7. Alabama, Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming have no specific provisions relating
to classification.
8. Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia. Idaho and South Dakota have constitutional provisions relating to
cumulative voting; statutes in these states may permit classification.

9. In an unreported case discussed by

WILL Ams,

CUMULATVE

VoviNG

FoR

DimcroRs 49-51 (1951)' it appears that the Pennsylvania classification statute was
held constitutional. Hepps & Cohen v. A. M.lByers Co., Allegheny County, Pa., 1950,
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Cohen v. A. M. Byers Co., 363 Pa. 618, 70 A.2d 837
(1950) (the supreme court did not reach the constitutional issue).
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Interpreting the specific constitutional provision in question 10 to conclude

that classification violates it is not without some difficulty. Section 3
provides that shareholders shall be entitled to vote the number of shares
of stock they own ".

.

. for as many persons as there are directors or

managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate
as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of his
shares of stock shall equal.

.

..

"

The instant court concluded that "to

be elected" did not qualify "number of directors." The language of the
section is ambiguous on this point, an ambiguity that was noticed by one
commentator." If "to be elected" is interpreted as a qualifying phrase,
then apparently this section would not prohibit classification. Although
such a reading would not be unreasonable in a purely literal sense, it would
render less likely the chance of securing the objectives of cumulative
voting.
These objectives are to provide a means whereby a minority can secure
representation on the board of directors 12 and, also, to foster a closer
combination of ownership and management. 13 However, cumulative voting
does not purport to guarantee representation to every shareholder. 14 Furthermore, there are methods by which a majority may effectively deny
representation to all but the strongest minority. One such method is that
of electing directors under a classified system. 15 Assuming a corporation
with a nine-man board of directors, elected annually, it will take 10% of
the stock voted plus one share to elect one director. However, if the board
is classified into equal groups of three, then to elect one director it will take
25% of the stock voted plus one share.' 6 In that situation, if a minority
cannot obtain in excess of 24% of the stock voted, they will never be able
to achieve representation on the board after the initial election following
the adoption of a classification system.' 7 Such a system also makes it
impossible for even a majority stockholder to acquire control in less than
10. See note 2 supra. Montana, Nebraska, and West Virginia have substantially
identical constitutional provisions and they also permit classification.
11. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of The Illinois Blsiness Corporation Act, 1
U. OF Cm. L. REv. 357, 385 (1934). Apparently the drafters of the Model Corporation Act felt it necessary to modify language similar to the Illinois provision in order
to avoid the same ambiguity. MODEL BusiNEss CoRPoarIoN Acr § 31 (rev. 1950).
12. Durkee v. People, 155 Ill. 354, 40 N.E. 626 (1895); Commonwealth v.
Flannery, 203 Pa. 28, 52 Atl. 129 (1902); Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch.
39, 147 At. 255 (Ch. 1929) ; 5 FLLTCHER, op. cit. sura note 5, § 2048; BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 177 (rev. ed. 1946).
13. WILtIAMS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15.
14. See Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (Ch. 1929).
15. BALLANTiNE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 177; WILLIAMs, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 48; Ballantine, supra note 11, at 385.
16. The formula for determining the percentage of stock voted to elect one director is: Y

100%
-

N+1

+ 1, where Y is the required percentage, and N is the number

of directors to be elected. Cole, Legal and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative
Voting, 2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950).
17. Note, Classificatim of Directors and Its Effect Upon Cumulative Voting in
.
Corporate Elections, 56 DicK. L. REv. 330, 334-35. (1952).
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two years. This prevents the ready response of management to new ideas
and policies. Whenever non-management groups resort to proxy solicitation, they must pay their own expenses, and if the board is classified this
burden is increased because of the necessity of more than one proxy
campaign. " 8 On the other hand, staggering elections may contribute to
the continuity and stability of corporate policy through an experienced
board of directors. This would explain the fact that staggering is mandatory for railroads incorporated in Illinois 19 and for certain federal institutions.2 0 Also, many private corporations without cumulative voting
voluntarily employ classification. 21 However, in the case of national banks,
where cumulative voting is mandatory, annual election of all directors is
required.22
Another method of decreasing minority representation, assuming it is
permitted by the corporation statutes, is a reduction in the number of
directors.2
If the board is reduced to three, it is possible to obtain the
same mathematical effect upon minority representation as is achieved by
classification in the instant case. Obviously, classification could not also
be utilized with a board of that number since cumulative voting requires
election of more than one director. 24 Thus, since the entire board would
be elected annually, a majority could gain control in a shorter period
than prevails under a stagger system; presumably, the necessity of twoyear proxy campaigns would be obviated. Another difference between
classification and a board consisting of only three members is that the
latter retains the strict concept of cumulative voting, since shareholders can
compute their voting strength by using the total number of directors.
Therefore, the fact that a legislature lawfully may provide for a minimum
of three directors does not compel the conclusion that it also can provide
for classification. It may be doubtful if a controlling group, especially in a
sizable corporation, would be desirous of having a governing board of as
18. See Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder
Sovereignty, 41 CALi'. L. REv. 393, 435 (1953). Of the total number of issues raised
by non-management proxy statements during the period 1951-52, in only 4% was
cumulative voting or the stagger system debated. On the other hand, under the
SEC proposal rule 20% of the proposals related to cumulative voting and one of
the most frequent reasons given for desiring this right was that classification was
employed by the corporation. EmEnsoN & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEaocRAcy

103-04, 127 (1954).
19. hI. ANN. STAT. c.114, § 8 (1954).
20. E.g., National Farm Loan Association. 39

STAT.

365 (1916), as amended,

12 U.S.C. §712 (1952).
21. W ImAms, op. cit: supra note 9, at 49; of 1000 domestic corporations whose

securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 142 elect their directors by

classes and, of these, 61 also have cumulative voting. Brief for Appellants, pp. 87-90,
Wolfson v. Avery, No. 33563, Ill. Sup. Ct., March Term, 1955.
22. 13 STAT. 102 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 71 (1952). California and Wyoming are
the only states with mandatory cumulative voting that require annual election of all

directors.
23. E.g., ILL. ANN.

STAT.

c.32, § 157.34 (1954);

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 15, §2852-

401 (Supp. 1954) (both would permit a reduction to a minimum of three).
24. Wright v. Central Cal. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).
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few as three members. However, a majority determined to preclude
minority representation may reduce the board if classification is not permitted. Perhaps in such a case, at least where there is a constitutional
cumulative voting provision, a court could be persuaded to grant a minority
relief on equitable principles. 25 Some jurisdictions, apparently realizing
that the reducing device provides a method to subvert the purposes of cumulative voting, have enacted statutes which protect a minority from any
reduction which would defeat their existing power to elect a member of the
board.26
Where cumulative voting is made mandatory by statute, there is a
problem of whether that statute or one permitting classification will prevail.
Since the enactments are of equal authority, both probably will be allowed
to stand despite their apparent conflict 21 Where both cumulative voting
and classification are permissive, since a majority may abolish the former
by properly amending the corporate charter,28 there appears little reason
to believe that a subsequent by-law or charter amendment authorizing
classification would be held invalid. Perhaps if cumulative voting and
classification are established by authority of equal grade, an analysis of the
policies underlying each provision will provide a guide to invalidate classification in those situations where it serves only to abuse the rights of nonmanagement groups.29 If the cumulative voting right is conferred by a
constitutional provision worded like that of Illinois, no reasonable interpretation would permit classification.30 In those states with different constitutional provisions, assuming they could justifiably be interpreted as not
precluding classification, a court should prevent only an unreasonable exercise of the statutory power to classify directors. Admittedly such a solution is not in strict accord with the conceptual basis of cumulative voting.
However, it would eliminate the result of totally depriving corporations of
the benefits of classification where its effect upon cumulative voting, as in
the case of a board of fifteen or more members, does not produce severe
results ipon shareholder voting strength. Minority rights could be protected adequately by requiring that the group supporting classification
should have the burden of proving that this device is not being used
primarily to deny minority representation.
25. But cf.. Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y.
Supp. 425 (1st Dep't 1910).
26. MicH. STAT. AxN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1953) ; CAL. Cor,. CODE § 3640 (1948).
27. See Bowes & De Bow, Cuimulative Voting at Electomt of Directors of Corporations, 21

MINx.

L. REv. 351, 367 (1937).

28. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 AtI. 255 (Ch. 1929).
29. Cf. In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.
1952). See Note, 37 CoL. L. REv. 292, 301 (1937). Statutes that permit a specified
majority to remove directors without cause present problems similar to classification
statutes as regards their effect upon the purposes of cumulative voting. It does not
appear that such statutes have been challenged in the courts. See BALLANTINE, op.
cit. supra note 12, § 185; Bowes & De Bow, supra note 27, at 366-68.
30. See WmLIAms, op. cit. supra note 9, at 50; Bowes & De Bow, supra note
27, at 367.
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EvidencePRIOR SALES AGREEMENT MUST BE
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE OF VALUE IN
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING
In a jury trial to fix an owner's compensation for land condemned
by the Pittsburgh Parking Authority, the Authority offered evidence of an
agreement of sale for $36,000 made by the owner three years and four
months before the taking. The contract was made at a time when foreclosure of a defaulted mortgage on the property was threatened; subsequently, neighboring property rapidly was developed and increased in
value. The owner's real estate expert valued the premises at $75,000 at
the time of both the agreement and the takitig; the Authority's expert
appraised at $36,000 and $42,500 for the two dates.. Over objection of the
Authority, the trial court excluded the evidence as too remote in time.
On appeal by the Authority, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and granted a new trial on the ground that the contract was not too remote
and that the property's appreciation since the agreement would go to the
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Berger v. Public
Parking Authority of Pittsburgh, 109 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1954).
In a trial'to determine compensation for land taken by eminent domain,
evidence of sales prices of similar property in the neighborhood, or evidence of prior sales prices or offers for the same property, is logically
relevant to the valuation of the condemned land. In many jurisdictions
a judge is vested with the discretion to determine whether there is good
reason to exclude this logically relevant evidence,' and an appellate court
is reluctant to reverse this determination.2 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has formulated a rule which excludes sales prices of similar property
on the issue of market value of the condemned land, and thus has removed
this question from the trial judge's discretion.8 If a witness has testified
that he considered or relied on similar sales in his estimate, evidence of
these prices may come in on cross-examination to test his credibility; 4
but these witnesses, often well versed in rules of evidence, can easily avoid
1. Thornton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So.2d 545 (1948); Wassenich v.
Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 Pac. 533 (1919) ; Forest Preserve Dist. v. Barchard, 293
Ill. 556, 127 N.E. 878 (1920) ; Burley v. Old Colony R.R., 219 Mass. 483, 107 N.E.
365 (1914) ; Tucker v. Town of Hampton, 96 N.H. 28, 69 A.2d 695 (1949) ; Hervey
v. Providence, 47 R.I. 378, 133 Atl. 618 (1926) ; Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Spartanburg Bonded Warehouse, Inc., 151 S.C. 542, 149 S.E. 236 (1929); Stolze v.
Manitowoc Terminal Co., 100 Wis. 208, 75 N.W. 987 (1898). See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EmINENT DOMAIN 582 n.2, 590 (2d ed. 1953).
2. ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 590.
3. East Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hiester, 40 Pa. 53 (1861), first set forth this rule,
and has never been overruled. Cf. Pittsburgh Terminal Warehouse & Transfer
Co. v. Pittsburgh, 330 Pa. 72, 198 Atl. 632 (1938) ; Serals v. West Chester Borough
School Dist., 292 Pa. 134, 140 Atl. 632 (1928). 14 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTIcE 520-21 (1939).
4. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives v. Philadelphia, 268 Pa. 559, 112
Atl. 76 (1920).
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statements of reliance so that their credibility may not be attacked.5 Thus,
prior to Berger, Pennsyslvania law made determination of market value
dependent on ofttimes widely divergent expert opinions 6 and evidence of a
purchase of, prior agreement on, or offer to sell the condemned property.
Whether this prior transaction evidence properly could be excluded in a
situation like the Berger case has been unclear.7 In Greenfield v. Philadelphia8 the court held that the price paid for the condemned property one
year before the taking was not too remote, even though the character of
the neighborhood had changed and values greatly increased. Although the
Berger court cites Greenfield as being "on all fours," it is dubious authority
for rejecting trial court discretion in excluding evidence since in that case
the trial court's discretion in receiving evidence was upheld.
By requiring admission of the contract price, even though the agreement was made in the shadow of foreclosure and prior to a neighborhood
real estate boom, the Berger court is setting down a rigid rule dependent
on the number of years between the transaction and the taking, and as a
practical matter is removing another area from the trial court's discretion.
The opinion seems to be founded on the great need for this evidence in
condemnation trials and the supposedly small danger of collateral -issues.
The majority opinion notes that evidence of sales of neighboring property
is excluded on the reasoning that too many collateral issues will arise, the
principal one being the degree of similarity of this property to the condemned land; 9 evidence of a prior contract to sell the condemned land
involves no problem of similarity, and the majority sees no problem with
other collateral issues.' 0 The dissent, on the other hand, contemplates
a "Pandora's Box of trial ills" which the Berger opinion will release."
Upon analysis this view seems somewhat justified since issues likely to
arise from the admission of a prior agreement to sell are the appreciation
of the land after the contract and the degree to which the transaction resulted from mere folly, a favor to a friend or relative, or a forced sale resulting from press for money or other personal reasons.12 These issues
may be met by introduction of new witnesses whose cross-examination
5. Graubart, Theory Versus Practice in the Trial of Condemnation Cases, 26
The tactics
of a witness in the instant case illustrate this point. See Record, pp. 38a-39a.
6. Graubart, .sipra note 5, at 36, 37, 39, 49; cf. WALLSTEiN, REPORT ON LAW
PA. BAR Ass'iq Q. 36, 39-40 (1954); Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-17.
AND PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION
CITY OF NwV YoRK v (1932).

APPLICABLE TO PROCEEDINGS

BROUGHT BY THE

7. Compare Berkley v. City of Jeannette, 373 Pa. 376, 96 A.2d 118 (1953), with
East Brandywine & W.R.R. v. Ranck, 78 Pa. 454 (1875), and Rea v. Pittsburg &
C.R.R., 229 Pa. 106, 78 Atl. 73 (1910).
8. 282 Pa. 344, 127 Atl. 768 (1925); cf. Lutz v. Allegheny County, 327 Pa.
587, 195 Atl. 1 (1937) (price paid seven years before condemnation properly admitted); Bloch v. Reading, 27 Berks Co. L.J. 264 (Berks County, Pa., C.P. 1935)
(purchase price three years before condemnation properly admitted).
9. Cf. Pittsburgh & W.R.R. v. Patterson, 107 Pa. 461 (1885).
10. Instant case at 711.
11. Id. at 719.
12. See Pittsburgh & W.R.R. v. Patterson, 107 Pa. 461 (1885).

,
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and attempted impeachment will lead to additional issues with ensuing
danger of trial delay and jury confusion.'3
The doubtful reasoning on collateral issues seems motivated by an
attempt to maintain the greatly criticized rule 14 on exclusion of other sale
evidence and at the same time force some concrete evidence into a condemnation trial. If evidence of prior transactions is not admitted, reliance
must be placed almost exclusively on so-called experts who may not necessarily be skilled by training or experience to draw inferences, and who
qualify merely because of some familiarity with real estate transactions.15
Since many are professional witnesses, their approach to the task of valuation may be colored by the knowledge that their immediate and future
employment depends upon production of the desired result. 16 Thus
estimates often vary widely, having ranged in one case from $4,000 to
$160,000,17 and in another from $15,500 to $129,000.18 These estimates can
have little significance to a jury unless reconciled with actual transactions.
The agreement in Berger would have been useful in evaluating the opinions
of the experts, one of whom valued the property at the time of the contract
at 200 per cent of the agreed price.
Because of the peculiar problems of evidence in condemnation trials,
the Berger decision probably was not intended to change the general rule
in Pennsylvania, 9 recommended as Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,2 0 that a trial judge has discretion in the admissibility of evidence.
This limitation on the holding also may be inferred from the fact that the
majority did not purport to decide the case on the theory of an abuse of
discretion, although the dissent did urge that this was the problem involved. 2 ' On the other hand, a comprehensive review of the problem of
evidence in condemnation proceedings, as was urged by the Authority,
might have resulted in an overruling of prior law on similar sales, and a
decision to leave the whole matter to the discretion of the trial court. This
seems preferable to rigid rules since the trial judge can better weigh
probative value in a particular trial against the risk of confusion, delay,
and unfair surprise to the other party.22
13. See 2 WIGMoaE, EVIENCE 428 (3d ed. 1940).
14. Eagan, The Unrealistic Rule Excluding Direct Testinony as to Comparable
Sales in Condemnation, 66 REPORT OF N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 232-41 (1943);
Graubart, supra note 5, at 37-42; 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE 505 (3d ed. 1940); 36
CORNELL L.Q. 137 (1950).
15. 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 565-73.
16. WA.LSTIN, op. cit. szpra note 6, at ix. See Graubart, supra note 5, at
39, 50.
17. See Leaf v. Pennsylvania Co., 268 Pa. 579, 112 Atl. 243 (1920).
18. See Lutz v. Allegheny County, 327 Pa. 587, 195 At. 1 (1937).
19. Thompson v. American Steel & Wire Co., 317 Pa. 7, 11, 175 Atl. 541, 543
(1934).
20. The Uniform Rules have been approved by both the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute and have won overwhelming indorsement by the
'Pennsylvania Bar Association's Committee on Judicial Administration. Levin, Th
Impact of the Uniform Rules of Ezidence on Pennsylvania Law, 26 PA. BAR Ass'N

Q. 216 (1955).

21. Instant case at 717.
22. See 5 NIcHOLs, EMINENT. DOMAIN 210-11 (3d ed. 1952); 2 WIGMORE,
EvIDNcE 428 (3d ed. 1940); UNFoR RuLx.s OF EvroENcE, Rule 45 and comment.
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Forum Non ConveniensTRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION LIMITED WHEN
FORUM NON CONVENIENS WOULD FORCE
AMERICAN PLAINTIFF TO SUE IN
FOREIGN COURTS
Plaintiff, a citizen of New York, sued in a federal district court in
Texas to recover money and equipment which passed to defendant, a corporation domiciled in Texas, under an alleged contract entered into between
the parties in Mexico. The defendant successfully moved for dismissal
on the ground of forum non conveniens, alleging in part that (1) all the
transactions took place in Mexico, the civil law of which the federal district
courts were not empowered to administer, (2) all its records were in
Mexico, (3) all individuals involved in the negotiations with plaintiff
resided in Mexico, and (4) it would be virtually impossible for important
witnesses to appear in Texas. The court of appeals, although refusing to
accept the plaintiff's contention that he had an absolute right to try the
case in the district court, reversed, holding that "positive evidence of unusually extreme circumstances" resulting in manifest injustice to the defendant would be required to justify denial of a citizen's access to the
courts of this country. Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d 353

(5th Cir. 1955).
The forum nonconveniens doctrine,1 as it is applied by the federal
courts, is designed to protect defendants against vexatious forum choices
sometimes attempted under the liberal venue requirements of the judicial
code.2 Although of comparatively recent judicial$ and legislative 4 recog1. ". . . [Forum non conveniven . . . deals with the discretionary power of
a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the
cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere." Blair, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Convenies in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoL. L. R v. 1 (1929). "In
all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniene comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the
doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 506 (1947).

See also GooDRicH, CoNFLicr oF

LAWs

22 (3d ed. 1949).

2. Note particularly 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952) in regard to corporations. Note,
Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J. 1234, 1240 (1947).
See also Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HAgv. L. REv. 908 (1947);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
3. Forum non conveniens received express approval for the first time in the leading cases of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) and Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), although the Supreme Court had noted
and commented on the doctrine previously. See, e.g., Williams v. Green Bay &
W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952) provides: "For convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
"Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. . . . The new subsection requires the court to determine that the
transfer is necessary for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further,
that it is in the interest of justice to do so." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. A132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. A127 (1946). See
also, Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949) ; Kaufman, Observations on Transfers
Under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595 (1951).
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nition, the doctrine, long applied without name in admiralty suits between
0
foreigners,5 is now firmly established in the general federal law. As a
result of the doctrine's newness, however, limitations on the trial courts'
discretionary power to decline jurisdiction are still in the process of
crystallizing. Most courts,7 when faced with this plea in a case where
the plaintiff could bring suit in another federal district, have applied the
conservative test set forth by the Supreme Court in the leading case of
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 8-the plaintiff's choice of forum will not be disturbed unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendant. This test, although illustrating a reluctance to impose undue
restrictions on a plaintiff's choice of forum,9 has resulted in dis'missals
when the defendant showed that most witnesses or necessary records were
located in another place. 10 The instant case has imposed even stricter
limitations on the trial court's discretion when application of the forum
non conveniens rule would~force an American plaintiff to seek redress in a
foreign court. However, despite some early decisions '1 and recent dicta'2
to the contrary, it appears that even in this situation discretion never has
been abolished completely. A citizen plaintiff has been relegated to a
foreign court on the ground that local courts were without power to enforce the remedial provisions of the foreign law under which the cause
of action arose, 13 and a citizen suing as subrogee of a foreigner has been
directed to seek relief in a more convenient foreign forum. 14 No inde5. Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932); Charter
Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515 (1930) ; The Belgenland,
114 U.S. 355 (1885).

6. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Reich v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Texas 1953); Wheeler v. Societe Nationale
des Chemins de Fer Francais, 108 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); De Sairigne v.
Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 912 (1950); Giles v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 616
(D. Minn. 1947).
7. E.g., Mazinski v. Dight, 99 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Pa. 1951); United States
v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Di Lella v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 7 F.R.D. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Cf. Giles v. Western Air Lines, Inc.,
73 F. Supp. 616 (D. Minn. 1947).

8. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
9. See Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947)
cited id. at 524, 535 (dissenting opinion).

and cases

10. Compare Giles v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 616 (D. Minn. 1947),

with Mazinski v. Dight, 99 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Di Lella v. Lehigh
Contra: Cox v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72
Criteria for transfer under § 1404(a) are discussed

Valley R.R., 7 F.R.D. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

in Kaufman, supra note 4, at 605.

11. The Epsom, 227 Fed. 158 (W.D. Wash. 1915); The Neck, 138 Fed. 144
(W.D. Wash. 1905); The Falls of Keltie, 114 Fed. 357 (D. Wash. 1902); Bolden

v. Jensen, 70 Fed. 505 (D. Wash. 1895).

12. Reich v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 202, 203 (N.D. Texas
1953).
13. Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); accord, Cuba R.R. v.
Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). But cf. Evey v. Mexican Ry., 81 Fed. 294 (5th
Cir. 1897).
14. United States Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika
Og Australie Line, 65 F2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933).
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feasible right of a citizen to try his foreign causes of action in American
courts has ever emerged.' 5 Indeed, the constitutionality of a treaty giving
foreign consuls exclusive cognizance of all disputes between the masters
of foreign ships and their crews was upheld even though it was construed
to deny a citizen seaman's right to sue such a master in American courts.' 6
Consideration of the reasoning in those unusual cases where citizens'
suits have been dismissed indicates that an arbitrary rule requiring the
court to accept jurisdiction would prove unsatisfactory. 17 Foreigners, for
example, might be encouraged to assign their causes of action to Americans
for the sole purpose of bringing suit in American courts. It is only under
the most extreme circumstances, however, that an American should be
denied access to courts which his taxes help to support and be forced to
depend on the uncertain justice of an unfamiliar, and perhaps unfriendly,
foreign forum.' 8 The formula provided in the instant case, as it is applied
to deny forum non conveniens despite a strong factual argument by the
defendant, appears to provide an equitable solution. In any event, the
standard is more explicit, and probably more restrictive, than those set
forth by other courts in deciding the same question.'
Plaintiffs probably
will continue to claim an absolute right of access to American courts since
the judges have been discussing the theory, 2° and the Supreme Court has
not chosen to repudiate it.21 The instant case indicates, however, that plaintiffs' most effective stratagem will be to show that local trial would not
impose a completely unconscionable burden on the defendant.
Parties to a contract can, as they did in this case, agree that the terms
of the contract will be construed according to the law of a particular jurisdiction. The fact that such agreements, which will ordinarily be upheld
by the courts,22 would require the application of foreign law, will not, in
15. See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 480 (1912); Wheeler v. Societe
Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 108 F. Supp. 652, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
See also United States Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske
Afrika Og Australie Line, 65 F2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933); De Sairigne v. Gould, 83
F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 912 (1950).
16. The Albergen, 223 Fed. 443 (S.D. Ga. 1915); The Welhaven, 55 Fed.
80 (S.D. Ala. 1892); The Burchard, 42 Fed. 608 (S.D. Ala. 1890).
17. Cf. United States Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske
Afrika Og Australie Line, 65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933); Libby, McNeil v. Bristol
City Line of Steamships, 41 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
18. This theory is expounded persuasively in Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35

L.Q. 12, 44 (1949).
19. Reich v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Texas 1953);

CORNELL

Wheeler v. Societe National des Chemins de Fer Francais, 108 F. Supp. 652
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matavazzo, 91 F. Supp.

469 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); The Saudades, 67 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
20. See instant case at 356; Reich v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp.
202, 203 (N.D. Texas 1953).
21. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 697
(1950).
22. See Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727, 730 (6th
Cir. 1948); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596, 598 (2d

Cir. 1946).

But cf. Boissevain v. Weil, 65 T.L.R. 197, 200 (K.B. 1949).
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itself, be grounds for dismissal on the plea of forum non conveniens.2
But, since ".

.

courts have for long looked with strong disfavor upon

contracts by which a party surrenders resort to any forum which was lawfully open to him," 24 the parties probably could not contract away the
jurisdiction of the federal courts by providing that disputes could be
litigated only in Mexico or some other foreign country.25 Such an agreement, although given no effect in the instant case because the existence of
the contract itself was in dispute, would seem to be a strong factor in determining whether forum non conveniens should be granted, however, and
might prove controlling in view of the fact that an avenue to dismissal has
been left open.

WarrantyIMPLIED WARRANTIES OF QUALITY HELD
NOT APPLICABLE TO BLOOD FURNISHED
BY HOSPITAL TO PATIENT
Plaintiff, a patient, received a transfusion of blood furnished by the
defendant hospital which the hospital had purchased from the third party
defendant, the Blood Transfusion Association.
Plaintiff contracted
jaundice from the blood and brought an action for damages charging the
hospital with breach of the implied warranties of fitness for particular purpose and of merchantability. The court dismissed the complaint as not
stating a cause of action, on the ground that the contract between plaintiff
and the hospital was for services and hence not within the warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.' Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123
N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
Characterizing the transaction as a contract for sale of services, the
court followed a line of authority which holds that the implied warranties
of quality found in the Uniform Sales Act 2 do not apply to transactions
23. See Evey v. Mexican R.R., 81 Fed. 294 (5th Cir. 1897).
24. See Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand,
C.J., concurring).
25. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U.S. 1874). See also Terral
v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (agreement imposed on a corporation by state.law that the corporation will not bring suit in federal courts is void) ;
Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270 (U.S. 1871) (same); Boyd v.
Grand Trunk W.R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (agreement between railroad and employee limiting venue for suit under F.E.L.A. is void). Contra: Detwiler v. Lowden,
198 Minn. 185, 269 N.W. 367 (1936); Gitler v. Russian Co., 124 App. Div. 273,
108 N.Y.S. 793 (Ist Dep't 1908). The RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §558 (1932)
states that bargains which "limit unreasonably the tribunal to which resort may be
had" are illegal. No judicial interpretation of reasonableness in this context has
been found, however. See HART & WECHSLER, Note on Agreement not to Resort
to the Federal'Courts in THE FEDIERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 605 (1953).
1. Three judges dissented on the ground that, construed liberally, the complaint
stated a cause of action since it alleged both a contract for the usual services of a
hospital and a separate contract for the sale of the blood.
2. UNIFORM SALES Act §§ 15(1), 15(2). The problem of the instant case was not
affected by the warranty provisions of the UNIFORM CoMMRCIA CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
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which are not "sales of goods." 8 However, this authority does not justify
the holding, since New York has long been among the jurisdictions which
hold that these warranties may be implied in situations other than sales
of goods.4 The "sale-service" dichotomy also was applied in those cases
holding that warranties did not apply to food dispensed by restaurants.;
However, New York and a majority of other jurisdictions have repuaiated
this doctrine and now hold the restauranteur liable without proof of fault
for personal injuries to patrons resulting from consumption of unwholesome or adulterated food. 6 One of the principal reasons for abandonment
of the "service" doctrine in the restaurant cases was the difficulty facing
the plaintiff in proving negligence.7 The means of proving negligence lie
almost entirely within the hands of the restaurant and often the only testimony available to establish negligence is that of its employees. The tort
remedy is even more inadequate where a hospital is involved, since the
situation parallels the restaurant cases as to plaintiff's problem of proof
and is complicated by the reluctance of many in the medical profession to
testify." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been used to ease or shift
the burden of proof when the law is in a state of flux between liability based
on fault and liability without fault, 9 but, when so used, results in creation

of a sporadic liability without fault, which, unforunately, depends often on
the ability of counsel for either side to influence a virtually unreversible
jury decision. 10 A further complication arises in many jurisdictions where
a substantial number of hospitals are not liable for negligence because of
their immunity as charities or governmental agencies." In New York,
however, a hospital is liable where it performs "administrative" functions
3. E.g., Racklin-Fagin Constr. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220, 281 N.Y.S. 426
(Sup. Ct. 1935) (contract to paint pictures) ; York Heating Co. v. Flannery, 87 Pa.
Super. 19 (1936) (sale and installation of heating system) ; Gerber v. Weinstein, 6
N.J. Misc. 284, 141 Atl. 3 (1928) (architect's drawings). See also VOLD, SALES

14-16 (1931).
4. E.g., Matter of Casualty Co., 250 N.Y. 410, 165 N.E. 829 (1929) (contract
to machine forgings) ; Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342
(1923) (lease of machine) ; Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. v. Boyle, 231 App. Div. 101,
246 N.Y.S. 142 (4th Dep't 1930) (gratuitous bailment of storage tank) ; Morgenthau
v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136 N.Y.S. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (lease of furnished house) ;
Silverman v. Imperial London Hotels, 137 L.T.R. 57, 43 T.L.R. 260 (K.B. 1927)
(use of Turkish bath facilities); Hartford Battery Sales Co. v. Price, 119 Pa.
Super. 165, 181 Atl. 95 (1935); see Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.
Cir. 1936). See 1 WI.STON, SALES 640-41 (Rev. ed. 1948); Note, 2 VAND. L.
REv. 675 (1949).
5. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CoNsumER 159-60 (1951);
VOLD, SALES 477 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, SALES 640 n.5 (Rev. ed. 1948); Prosser,
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 21 CAN. B. REv. 446, 477-79 (1943).
6. E.g., Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924); Cushing v.
Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See also authorities cited in note 5 supra;
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2).
7. Dicr soN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 171-80. See notes 19, 21 infra.
8. Cf. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
9. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Burr ALo L. REv. 1, 13-15 (1951).
10. Compare MORRIS, TORTS 137-38 (1953), discussing the effect of the judge's
charge in such cases.
11. Note, 32 N.C.L. REv. 129 (1953).
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in a negligent manner,12 although it is not responsible for "medical" negligence. 13 The decision to give a transfusion in a. particular situation would
be a medical one for which the hospital would not ordinarily be liable,' 4
but to have a supply of disease-free blood probably would be considered an
administrative function. 15
The implied warranties of quality have been used as devices for imposing liability without fault. 16 While some courts and commentators
have been reluctant to impose absolute liability where no means exist to
prevent the harm, 17 this factor has frequently been disregarded in applying
warranties to other products.' 8 However, in the determination of whether
warranties should be implied in a new area, it is felt that the imposition of
liability will provide the necessary incentive if the harm is in any way
preventable through increased diligence of the defendant. 19 The instant
court looked outside the record and the briefs to find that the harm was not
preventable2 0 On the assumption that this use of judicial notice is proper
and that the conclusions of the medical authorities cited by the court are
correct, the motive of. prevention of the harm is removed as a basis for
imposing absolute liability. In any event, since hospitals are public institutions dedicated to the prevention and treatment of disease, it seems.
likely that there is sufficient incentive to prevent the harm involved regardless of the imposition of absolute or qu~lifid liability. Another function of
the law of both tort and warranty is risk distribution.21 In the preponderance of cases involving patients and hospitals, the hospital will be the better
risk bearer, since expensive medical treatment is beyond the means of
12. E.g., Holtforth v. Rochester Gen. Hospital, 304 N.Y. 27, 105 N.E.2d 610
(1952); Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d
28 (1937); cf. Cadicamo v. Long Island College Hospital, 124 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y.
1954) ; compare Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 269
App. Div. 955, 58 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945), with Phillips v. Buffalo Gen.
Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
13. E.g., Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, supra note 12; cf. Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E.2d 391 (1953) ; see Schloendorff v. Society
of N.Y. Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 132-33, 105 N.E. 92, 94-95 (1914).
14. Parker v. State, 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1952),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 280 App. Div. 901, 304 N.Y. 989 (Ct. App. 1952).
15. Cf. Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940) (hospital
liable where it administered decomposed drugs to a nurse under its care).
16. See Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F2d 864, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Brown, The
Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23 MINN. L. Rsv. 585,
593-94 (1939) ; Prosser, supra note 5, at 451-53; VoLD, SALES 474-75 (1931).
17. See Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MicH. L.
Rrv. 494, 502-05 (1936), and cases cited therein.
18. Dicx asoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 48-51; VoL, SALES 455-56, 460-61 (1931);
Brown, supra note 16, at 594.
19. Encouragement of higher standards was given as one of the reasons for
abandonment of the "service' doctrine as to restaurants. Cushing v. Rodman, 82
F2d 864, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; DiciEmsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 169-70.
20. Instant case at 795. The dissenting opinion points out that the plaintiff had
no opportunity to rebut the authorities cited by either evidence or argument. Id. at
798.
21. See Momts, ToRTs 246-53 (1953); authorities cited in note 19 upra. Risk
distribution was given as another reason for the change in doctrine in the restaurant
cases. See note 19 supra.
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most individuals, while most hospitals have sufficient reserves to meet such
costs.22 In addition, standard insurance policies to cover this liability
are available to hospitals and have been obtained by many of them3 These
policies provide a means for wider distribution of the economic burden of
illness caused by infected blood. Pure chance determined that the plaintiff
rather than any other patient received the particular pint of blood which
caused the harm, and it seems just to distribute the burden among those
who had an equal probability of receiving it. This is particularly true in
the instant case, where this hospital could pass the loss back to the third
party defendant which could then distribute the loss among all the hospitals
to which it sells blood, and through them, in the form of a higher charge
for blood, to the persons who obtained blood from this common source
and received benefit therefrom.
Regardless of the conclusion reached on the liability issue, the court's
opinion does a disservice by framing the issue in terms of the "service"
doctrine. The court seems to have narrowed the area in which warranties
may be implied to that covered by the Uniform Sales Act and, in so doing,
has contributed to the stultifying effect of codification on the law which
24
it had refused to permit in earlier cases.
22. Cf. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Assn, 43 Wash.2d 162, 16970, 260 P.2d 765, 769-70 (1953), 11 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 277 (1954).
23. See Note, 2 KAN. L. RE-v. 188, 189-90 (1953). Compare Comment, 5
CATiHOic U.L. REv. 101, 104-05 (1955).
24. See cases cited in note 4 supra. Compare Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190
N.E. 479 (1934), in which the court changed its decisional rule governing seller's
right to recover the full purchase price when buyer defaulted on a contract to
purchase stock. The change was made to conform this rule to that of the Uniform
Sales Act although the situation was not within the terms of the Act.

